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Abstract
Background: Although policy discourses frame integrated Electronic Health Records (EHRs) as essential for
contemporary healthcare systems, increased information sharing often raises concerns among patients and the
public. This paper examines patient and public views about the security and privacy of EHRs used for health
provision, research and policy in the UK.
Methods: Sequential mixed methods study with a cross-sectional survey (in 2011) followed by focus group
discussions (in 2012-2013). Survey participants (N = 5331) were recruited from primary and secondary care settings
in West London (UK). Complete data for 2761 (51.8 %) participants were included in the final analysis for this paper.
The survey results were discussed in 13 focus groups with people living with a range of different health conditions,
and in 4 mixed focus groups with patients, health professionals and researchers (total N = 120). Qualitative data
were analysed thematically.
Results: In the survey, 79 % of participants reported that they would worry about the security of their record if this
was part of a national EHR system and 71 % thought the National Health Service (NHS) was unable to guarantee
EHR safety at the time this work was carried out. Almost half (47 %) responded that EHRs would be less secure
compared with the way their health record was held at the time of the survey. Of those who reported being
worried about EHR security, many would nevertheless support their development (55 %), while 12 % would not
support national EHRs and a sizeable proportion (33 %) were undecided. There were also variations by age,
ethnicity and education. In focus group discussions participants weighed up perceived benefits against potential
security and privacy threats from wider sharing of information, as well as discussing other perceived risks:
commercial exploitation, lack of accountability, data inaccuracies, prejudice and inequalities in health provision.
Conclusions: Patient and public worries about the security risks associated with integrated EHRs highlight the need
for intensive public awareness and engagement initiatives, together with the establishment of trustworthy security
and privacy mechanisms for health information sharing.
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Background
Information privacy and security issues have long been
debated in the context of technological change and elec-
tronic databases in healthcare [1–5]. Despite extensive
ethical and technical analysis, concerns remain as the ef-
fort to make health information accessible to and usable
by a wide range of health professionals, researchers and
planners often conflicts with notions of patient confiden-
tiality and autonomy [6–8]. In the UK, privacy and
security concerns are repeatedly discussed in popular
media with numerous reports of patient information
being stolen, lost, misplaced or released without author-
isation (see [9] for a review). Areas of concern were also
highlighted in the 2013 Information Governance Review,
which noted that 186 serious data breaches had been re-
ported to the Department of Health between July 2011
and June 2012 in England [10]. The landscape is changing
rapidly, with new challenges emerging as re-identification
techniques for previously anonymised data develop, and
ethical questions raised by the increasing attention to gen-
omic information become more urgent [11–13].
Empirical work on patient and public attitudes to
technological implementation and integrated Electronic
Health Records (EHRs) for health provision and second-
ary purposes has to date identified generally positive
attitudes towards wider health information sharing and
record linkage, with some variation in views between
different socio-demographic groups and between indi-
viduals with different levels of personal exposure to
health services [14–18]. However, information security
and privacy assurances, such as strong anonymity and
consent mechanisms, continue to play a significant role
in sustaining patient trust in record keeping practices
[14, 17, 19–28]. Patients may choose to withhold infor-
mation and delay seeking treatment rather than reveal
specific types of health information, especially when they
perceive they have little control over its use [29–34].
Even sharing information between health professionals
may raise patient concerns, for example in the case of
potentially stigmatising conditions [35, 36].
In this study we explore (i) the extent to which patients
and the public report being worried about the security of
integrated EHRs (as systems including longitudinal clinical
information from different sources and used simultan-
eously for different purposes, such as care provision,
research and planning); (ii) how these worries relate
to levels of support about the development of EHRs;
(iii) what differences exist between groups with differ-
ent socio-demographic characteristics, health condi-
tions and patterns of interaction with the health
service. Findings from a quantitative survey are com-
bined with analysis of qualitative focus group discus-
sions to further explore the rationale behind patient
support and concerns about EHRs.
Methods
This paper presents findings from a sequential mixed
methods study using an initial survey questionnaire to
elicit high-level patient and public perceptions on differ-
ent questions about EHRs, which were then examined in
more detail in a series of focus group discussions. The
two phases of the study are explained in the following
sections.
Phase 1: survey questionnaire
A cross-sectional survey questionnaire was administered
to patients and members of the public from a stratified
cluster random sample of 8 waiting rooms of General
Practice (GP) surgeries and 8 outpatient waiting areas of
a teaching National Health Service (NHS) hospital in
West London between August and September 2011.
To develop the questionnaire the project team carried
out an extensive review of the literature and identified
factors that might influence how patients and the public
view EHRs (e.g., age, health status, frequency of health-
care visits, educational background, ethnicity). Through
multiple iterations this framework provided the founda-
tion to construct the survey questions which were then
compared with existing tools measuring patient attitudes
on the topic. Cardiff TELEform survey software was used
to develop the final version of the questionnaire which
was then piloted for use with 30 adults (over age 18)
from the general population. Pilot participants were se-
lected from nurse patient advocacy groups, patient and
public involvement networks, and personal contacts of
the research team. Participants varied according to age,
gender, education, ethnicity, parents, carers, people with
and without long-term health conditions, and people
with differing levels of experience with healthcare practice
and research. Multiple rounds of piloting and revision of
the questionnaire were conducted with the same sample
of 30 individuals over a period of three months until all
participants responded that they understood each ques-
tion, accepted the design and layout as a whole, and were
able to complete it within ten minutes [37].
Recruitment for the main survey was carried out in
hospital waiting areas where the team had the opportun-
ity to approach patients living with a diverse range of
health conditions as they waited for their appointments
with different specialties: orthopaedics, bariatric, urology,
maxillofacial, pain, diabetes, HIV and sexual health, derma-
tology, eye, antenatal and phlebotomy. Participants filled in
the questionnaire on their own without receiving any help
or other instructions from the researchers. A random sam-
pling design was used to minimise selection bias, with re-
cruitment carried out on different days and at different
times, divided equally between GP surgeries and the hos-
pital. Only individuals over 18 years old who were able to
understand the information describing the study in English
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were eligible to participate. All participants provided in-
formed consent on the first page of the questionnaire.
The front page of the survey defined EHRs as a record
that, if created, would store everything about a patient’s
health and healthcare visits from birth until death,
bringing together under one record all separate paper
and electronic files held across different health pro-
viders. The questionnaire contained 31 items, including
questions on socio-demographic characteristics (birth
year, sex, ethnicity, highest level of educational attain-
ment) and health-related information (long-term health
conditions and frequency of health visits). Survey ques-
tions on views about EHR security were:
1. If your record was part of a national electronic
records system, would you worry about the security
of your record? (Response options: Yes/No)
2. Do you think the NHS is presently able to make
electronic health records secure? (Response options:
Yes/No)
3. How do you feel about the security of electronic
health records compared to your current health
records? (Response options: Less secure/Equally
Secure/More secure)
The data analysis further compares views about EHR
security, identified through the questions above, with
support for the development of EHRs as measured in
the same survey (Response options: Yes/No/Undecided)
and examined more closely in an earlier publication
[15]. A copy of the survey questionnaire and other
methodological details on the quantitative phase of the
study are published elsewhere [37].
Survey data analysis
We conducted univariate analysis to describe our sample
(Table 1) and to determine the proportions of people in
each of the response options for our outcome variables
(Figs. 1, 2 and 3). Using chi-squared tests of statistical
significance, we examined perceived security views
against overall support for EHRs (Table 2). In logistic
regression analysis we assessed participants’ socio-
demographic and health-related characteristics in rela-
tion to their views about security of national EHRs and
their confidence in the ability of the NHS at the time of
the survey to maintain EHR security (Table 3). We used
multivariate multinomial regression models to examine
the relationships between perceptions of EHR security
compared with perceptions of security of current re-
cords, taking respondent socio-demographic and health-
related characteristics into account (Table 4). Regression
models only included independent variables significantly
associated with the outcome of interest in bivariate ana-
lysis (p < 0.05).
Participants who provided incomplete responses for
one or more variables were excluded from the final
analysis (48.2 %). To examine potential differences be-
tween respondents who were included in the analysis
sample with those who were excluded, we performed
missing data analysis using logistic regression models
(results included in Additional file 1). P-values and 95
% confidence intervals were adjusted for clustering by
Table 1 Socio-demographic and health-related characteristics
of the sample, N = 2761
% (N)
Age category
18–24 8.1 (225)
25–34 (base) 26.5 (732)
35–44 21.2 (584)
45–54 15.5 (427)
55–64 11.8 (325)
65–74 10.5 (289)
75+ 6.5 (179)
Sex
Female (base) 59.1 (1,633)
Male 40.9 (1,128)
Ethnicity
White British (base) 56 (1,546)
White Non-British 20.2 (559)
Black/African/Caribbean/British Black 7.4 (205)
Asian/Asian British 8.1 (223)
Mixed/Multiple 8.3 (228)
Educational qualifications
No academic qualification 4.9 (136)
GCSE 11.2 (310)
A-Levels 10.2 (282)
Vocational qualification 12.4 (342)
Degree 36.4 (1,006)
Higher Degree (base) 24.8 (685)
Clinic type
GP clinic (base) 33.6 (927)
Outpatient 66.4 (1,834)
Frequency of healthcare use in past 6 months
0 to 2 (base) 36.4 (1,004)
3 to 5 34.7 (957)
6 to 9 15.9 (439)
10 plus 13.1 (361)
Long term conditions
No conditions (base) 34.8 (961)
At least one condition 65.2 (1,800)
Total 100 (2,761)
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sampling site in all cases. Data analysis was carried
out using STATA IC 9.0.
Phase 2: qualitative study
To explore the results of the survey in more detail, we
carried out 17 qualitative focus group discussions with a
total of 114 patients living with different conditions and
carers (September 2012 – April 2013). Four of the focus
groups also included health professionals, health re-
searchers and NHS managers to further understand any
differences in opinion between professionals with experi-
ence using EHRs and members of the public. Individuals
interested in the study who did not wish to join a group
discussion were interviewed separately (6 participants).
Our sampling methodology was driven by the survey
findings and aimed to capture the widest range of perspec-
tives possible. Recruitment was carried out through pa-
tient organisations and support groups, West London GP
practices and hospitals, and carers’ centres. Condition-
specific focus groups and interviews covered a wide range
Fig. 1 Respondent views on whether they would worry if their record was part of a national EHR system, N = 2761
Fig. 2 Respondent views on the ability of the NHS to maintain EHR security at the time of the survey, N = 2761
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of areas including people living with diabetes, asthma and
allergies, thyroid disorders, rheumatoid arthritis, heart
conditions, sickle cell disorders and HIV. We also orga-
nised focus groups to specifically examine the views of
older and younger people, those identifying as black mi-
nority ethnic groups, and carers (one focus group per
category).
Focus groups lasted between 60–110 min and inter-
views between 30–45 min. Two researchers experienced
in qualitative research supported the discussions, with
one primarily responsible for facilitation and the other
for taking detailed notes. An indicative focus group
guide was used including questions on participants’ ex-
periences with information sharing between different
NHS providers, their hopes and concerns around inte-
grated systems used for healthcare, research, and plan-
ning purposes, as well as their thoughts on the best ways
to involve patients and members of the public in
decision-making about the future of EHRs. Additional
materials in the form of comic illustrations were also
Fig. 3 Respondent views about EHR security compared with their own records, N = 2761
Table 2 Relationships between EHR security perceptions and overall support for national EHRs, N = 2761
Overall, are you in favour of the development of a national electronic health records system?
Yes No Undecided Total
% (N) % (N) % (N) % (N)
Worried about security if record was part of national EHR system
No 86.1 (501) 2.7 (16) 11.2 (65) 100 (582)
Yes 55 (1,199) 12.3 (269) 32.6 (711) 100 (2,179)
Pearson chi2(2) = 188.2000 p = 0.000
Perceptions about NHS ability to safeguard EHRs at the time
No 53.5 (1,053) 13 (255) 33.5 (660) 100 (1,968)
Yes 81.6 (647) 3.8 (30) 14.6 (116) 100 (793)
Pearson chi2(2) = 190.3913 p = 0.000
Perceived EHR security compared with current records
Less secure 46.5 (603) 17.4 (226) 36 (467) 100 (1,296)
Equally secure 72.7 (874) 4 (48) 23.3 (280) 100 (1,202)
More secure 84.8 (223) 4.2 (11) 11 (29) 100 (263)
Pearson chi2(4) = 280.8978 p = 0.000
Papoutsi et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making  (2015) 15:86 Page 5 of 15
used to increase engagement and trigger discussion around
the questions in the topic guide. Participants received a £30
gift voucher to cover travel expenses and to compensate
them for their time participating in the discussions.
All interactions were recorded and transcribed verba-
tim with written consent. We offered participants the
option to view their transcripts before the analysis but
did not receive any requests. Two researchers carried
out thematic analysis using a pre-defined coding framework
which they refined through iterative rounds of deductive
(codes identified in advance) and inductive (codes emerging
from the data) coding. The researchers then compared their
findings and discussed differences in their coding with the
wider team to enhance understanding and identify nuances
in meaning. Preliminary findings were presented to and
discussed with a sub-group of participants (n = 24) who
attended 3 additional workshops organised in June 2013
with the aim of evaluating information materials on EHRs
(leaflets and online resources) and developing a video
charting the project journey (https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Uj4kXhBgqe4&feature=youtu.be).
Research ethics
The study was approved by the London Dulwich Research
Ethics Committee (Ref. No. 10/H0808/96). All participants
were provided with information sheets, either on the front
page of the survey or as a separate document, and gave
written consent to participate.
Results
Quantitative results
Sample characteristics
The overall response rate for the survey was 85.5 %,
(N = 5331), but fewer participants (N = 2761, i.e., 51.8 % of
respondents) provided complete data for all variables
included in the analysis for this paper (responses with
missing data have been excluded – see Additional file 1).
Table 1 describes our sample by birth year, sex, ethnicity,
educational qualifications, recruitment site, long-term
conditions and frequency of healthcare visits. Almost half
of the respondents (47.7 %) belonged to relatively young
age groups between 25–34 and 35–44 years old, many
were female (59.1 %) and more than half self-identified as
White British (56 %). Around two thirds of participants
reported having degrees or higher degrees (61.2 %), and
66.4 % were recruited from outpatient clinics for the sur-
vey. In terms of health-related characteristics, the sample
consisted of a large proportion of people with at least one
long-term health condition (65.2 %) and a moderate num-
ber of visits to health services: 36.4 % of participants had
Table 3 Logistic regression models: perceptions about national EHR security and the ability of the NHS to safeguard EHRs at the
time, N = 2761
Worried about security if record was part of national
EHR system (base: not worried)
Perceptions about NHS ability to safeguard EHRs at the
time (base: unable to safeguard EHRs)
RR 95 % CI p RR 95 % CI p
Age category (base: 25–34)
18–24 1.12 [0.76,1.64] 0.58 0.97 [0.74,1.27] 0.83
35–44 2.15 [1.74,2.66] 0.00 0.60 [0.49,0.74] 0.00
45–54 2.45 [1.75,3.43] 0.00 0.71 [0.56,0.89] 0.00
55–64 1.98 [1.49,2.63] 0.00 0.41 [0.30,0.55] 0.00
65–74 1.10 [0.75,1.63] 0.62 0.62 [0.43,0.90] 0.01
75+ 1.18 [0.82,1.69] 0.36 0.46 [0.27,0.79] 0.00
Ethnicity (base: White British)
White Non-British 0.74 [0.44,1.25] 0.26 0.63 [0.49,0.79] 0.00
Black British 0.74 [0.45,1.22] 0.24 1.15 [0.84,1.56] 0.38
Asian British 0.57 [0.35,0.93] 0.02 1.52 [0.95,2.43] 0.08
Mixed/Multiple/Other 1.10 [0.54,2.21] 0.80 1.21 [0.86,1.70] 0.28
Education (base: higher degree)
None 0.44 [0.30,0.65] 0.00 2.60 [2.04,3.32] 0.00
GCSE 0.68 [0.42,1.09] 0.11 1.62 [1.13,2.34] 0.01
A-Level 0.71 [0.51,1.00] 0.05 1.43 [1.06,1.94] 0.02
Vocational 0.87 [0.54,1.43] 0.59 1.53 [1.06,2.21] 0.02
Degree 0.86 [0.68,1.08] 0.20 1.07 [0.88,1.30] 0.53
The first logistic regression model compares those who would worry about the security of their record if this were part of a national EHR with those who would
not worry. The second logistic regression model compares those who think the NHS was able to make electronic health records secure at the time of the survey
with those who do not think the NHS was able to do so. P-values are adjusted for clustering by sampling site
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visited health services 0–2 times in the 6 months prior to
the survey and 34.7 % had made 3–5 visits in the same
period.
Respondent views about security
Overall, 78.9 % of respondents stated that they would
worry about the security of their health record if it were
part of a national electronic records system (Fig. 1).
Similarly, 71.3 % voiced doubts about the ability of the
NHS to guarantee the security of EHRs at the time the
survey was carried out (Fig. 2). Almost half (46.9 %) of
respondents said that detailed, integrated EHRs would
be less secure than the way they assumed their health re-
cords were held at the time of the survey, 43.5 % said se-
curity risks would be equal, and 9.5 % that security
would be increased (Fig. 3).
Relationship between security perceptions and overall
support for EHRs
Previously published results drawing on a preliminary
analysis from the same study showed moderately high
levels of support for the development of national EHRs
used simultaneously for healthcare provision, planning
and policy, and health research: 62.5 % of participants
reported overall support, 27.9 % reported being un-
decided and 9.6% said they would not support a national
EHR system used for multiple purposes [15]. Higher
levels of support were reported for specific uses of
EHRs. Most participants were in favour of EHRs specif-
ically for personal healthcare provision (89.7 %), for
health services policy and planning (79.5 %), or for re-
search (81.4 %), although 59.7 % and 67.1 % of respon-
dents would prefer their personal identifiers to be
removed for health policy and research respectively [15].
To further understand whether those stating that they
would be worried about national EHRs also report being
in favour or against their development, we carried out
analysis showing the relationships between the different
variables (Table 2). Of those who said they would worry
if their records were part of a national EHR system, 55
% nevertheless reported that they would support the de-
velopment of this system, 32.6 % were undecided in their
views, while 12.3 % would not be in favour of national
EHRs. There was a similar pattern between those who
thought that the NHS would be unable to guarantee the
security of EHRs at the time of the survey: 53.5 % re-
ported support for the development of national EHRs,
33.5 % were undecided and 13 % would not support the
system. Of those who thought EHRs would be less se-
cure compared with current records, 46.5 % said that
they would support the development of national EHRs,
17.4 % said they would not support them, and 36 %
Table 4 Multinomial regression model on perceptions of EHR security compared with current records, N = 2761
Perceptions of EHR security compared with current records (base: less secure)
Equally secure More secure
RR ci95 p RR ci95 p
Age category (base: 25–34)
18–24 1.24 [0.90,1.69] 0.19 1.28 [0.77,2.13] 0.35
35–44 0.67 [0.54,0.82] 0.00 0.68 [0.53,0.87] 0.00
45–54 0.56 [0.44,0.71] 0.00 0.52 [0.30,0.90] 0.02
55–64 0.52 [0.39,0.69] 0.00 0.57 [0.39,0.83] 0.00
65–74 0.65 [0.46,0.92] 0.02 0.60 [0.37,0.95] 0.03
75+ 0.63 [0.46,0.85] 0.00 0.63 [0.39,1.01] 0.06
Ethnicity (base: White British)
White Non-British 1.25 [1.02,1.53] 0.03 1.45 [1.05,2.00] 0.03
Black British 0.74 [0.54,1.00] 0.05 1.48 [0.99,2.20] 0.05
Asian British 1.26 [1.04,1.53] 0.02 2.28 [1.52,3.44] 0.00
Mixed/Multiple/Other 1.13 [0.88,1.45] 0.34 1.91 [1.17,3.11] 0.01
Education (base: higher degree)
None 1.55 [0.96,2.51] 0.07 3.05 [1.51,6.17] 0.00
GCSE 1.58 [1.05,2.38] 0.03 2.32 [1.48,3.65] 0.00
A-Level 1.26 [0.97,1.64] 0.08 1.50 [0.87,2.58] 0.14
Vocational 1.10 [0.75,1.60] 0.62 1.31 [0.85,2.03] 0.22
Degree 1.01 [0.78,1.32] 0.93 1.27 [0.96,1.67] 0.09
Multinomial regression model comparing those who feel that integrated electronic health records are as secure as or more secure than their current health
records, with those who report that integrated records would be less secure (base). P-values are adjusted for clustering by sampling site
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reported being undecided. People who did not report be-
ing worried about national EHR security were not neces-
sarily fully supportive of EHR development: 11.2 % said
they were undecided and 2.7 % that they were not in
favour of the development of this system. We explored
these findings in greater detail in focus group discus-
sions (presented in a separate section).
Associations between security perceptions and socio-
demographic and health-related characteristics
We used logistic regression models to identify associa-
tions between socio-demographic and other health-
related characteristics of the sample, in relation to views
about EHR security and what participants thought about
the ability of the NHS to safeguard EHRs when the sur-
vey was conducted (Table 3). Respondents between 35
and 64 years old were more likely to report that they
would be worried about the security of their records as
part of an integrated EHR system (OR = 1.98 to 2.45, p <
0.05) than the base group consisting of individuals 25–
34 years old (for age categories over 64 years old differ-
ences from the base group were not statistically signifi-
cant). Respondents over 35 years old were also more
likely to report less confidence in the ability of the NHS
to safeguard EHRs when the survey was conducted (OR
= 0.27 to 0.71, p < 0.05), than participants aged 25–34.
Individuals with no academic qualifications were less
likely to say that they would worry about security if their
record were part of a national EHR (RR = 0.44, p < 0.05),
compared with participants with higher degrees. Reported
confidence in the NHS to make EHRs secure at the time
of the survey was similarly inversely related to educational
levels.
After adjusting for all variables in multivariate multi-
nomial models, we identified further age, ethnicity and
education differences in security perceptions between in-
tegrated EHRs and established systems (Table 4). In
comparison with the base group aged 25–34, partici-
pants over 35 years of age were less likely to report that
integrated EHRs would be equally (RR = 0.52 to 0.67, p
< 0.05) or more (RR = 0.52 to 0.68, p < 0.05) secure com-
pared with the system they thought their health pro-
viders used for patient record management at the time
the survey was completed. Individuals who self-
identified as White non-British, Asian/Asian British and
Black/African/Caribbean/British Black were more likely
to respond that EHRs would be as secure as (OR = 1.25
and 1.26 respectively, p < 0.05) or more secure than
(OR = 1.45 and 2.28 respectively, p < 0.05) the existing
system, compared with White British groups. Those
identifying as Black/African/Caribbean/British Black
were also more likely to say that EHRs would be more
secure (RR = 1.48, p= 0.05) than those self-reporting as
White British. Participants with no educational qualifications
or holding General Certificates of Secondary Education
(GCSEs) were more likely than those with higher
degrees to suggest that EHRs would be more secure
(RR = 3.05, p < 0.05). No other associations between
security perceptions, socio-demographic and health
related variables were statistically significant.
Qualitative results
Drawing on the results of the quantitative survey, focus
group discussions further explored patient and public
views about the security of cradle-to-grave integrated
EHRs and the various rationales underlying readiness to
support their development.
Debating benefits for patient care against perceived EHR
security risks
Most participants expected EHRs to improve patient
care and treatment, from short-term emergencies to
long-term multifaceted management of chronic condi-
tions. In particular, they said that wider information-
sharing between health professionals could provide the
potential for faster diagnosis, more targeted interven-
tions and ‘linked up’ care for patients with complex
needs, among other benefits. Not having to repeat med-
ical histories could also enable more dignified care, some
said, especially for frail or vulnerable patients.
But also I think, if the electronic health records would
help so that my daughter doesn’t have to have
assessment after assessment after assessment, maybe
have one assessment and that’s shared between
everyone, because she has to constantly have all these
assessments, and it’s depressing to have to keep talking
about what you can’t do all the time. (FG10)
Rarely did participants express full support for the de-
velopment of EHRs without adding any caveats. More
often people engaged in a negotiation process where
they weighed up perceived benefits from using inte-
grated records against concerns about EHR security and
other risks. Hacking and identity theft were frequently
mentioned as being of concern, alongside unauthorised ac-
cess. People said they were particularly worried about insur-
ance companies, employers and ‘people outside the NHS’
having access to their records, as the more the information
was shared, the more difficult it would be to control:
– My concern is exactly that: who has access to my
files and how can we make sure that only those I
want to have access would have access? […]
– A record could just be available within the health
profession to begin with.
– But is [this where] the cancer begins, is [this where]
we say, yes, that’s fine [to share with other health
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professionals] and then it gets taken out of hand five
years later?
– Now it may be [that we] need to concede that
somewhere along the line things may get
contaminated. And there might be some exposure
[of health information to other occupational groups].
(FG12)
Focus group participants preferred different access
levels for different occupational groups, with certain
professionals being permitted access to full medical re-
cords (e.g., general practitioners) as opposed to a more
restricted or limited version being accessible to other
professionals who were not as involved with their care.
However, they also recognised that there might be legit-
imate reasons for different staff members to require
access to medical records. Some said they would feel un-
comfortable with health professionals having access to
their information beyond what would be strictly neces-
sary for the situation at hand, for example, instead of
pharmacists only being able to see what medication has
been prescribed, also being able to access the reasons for
the prescription. Others suggested that pharmacists
could act as a type of ‘safety net’ to correct mistakes if
they had access to more information. Participants often
talked about how particular sensitive details warranted
more security measures, although this raised questions
about how to ensure that measures are not routinely cir-
cumvented, while still being possible to override in
emergencies. Discussions also developed to encompass a
recognition that ‘no system is failsafe’.
And even if you put in security levels, it’s very difficult
because you could justifiably say that most of those 12
[occupational groups], it’s good they should have access
to your records. But I take the attitude, and I’ve been
in IT, you can have all the security systems you’ve got,
but if somebody wants to break into them they’ll break
into them. (FG5)
Participants from socially disadvantaged or ethnic minor-
ity backgrounds specifically expressed worries about how
information included in patient notes might unduly influ-
ence subsequent consultations in different settings. Beyond
information seen as potentially stigmatising (e.g., in relation
to sexual or mental health) participants said they worried
that health professionals might also make character judg-
ments, such as labelling a patient as ‘hypochondriac’ or as
having social problems, and that this could lead to difficul-
ties accessing appropriate care.
I know it could lead to negative labelling, definitely. And
it just comes down to the human level, with the nurse,
the GP dealing with patients, how it will affect their
treatment of people, I’m sure it will have an influence on
that. There will be someone down the line that will react
negatively, there’s no doubt about it. (FG7)
Other participants had found errors in their medical
records and worried that if incorrect information was
more widely shared it might have consequences on fur-
ther diagnoses or treatment decisions.
I now habitually collect a record of everything. If I
have blood tests or anything, I will say to the GP I
would like a copy of the records […] there’s an awful
lot of stuff on my records that isn’t accurate […] and if
people aren’t properly informed then they may not be
making the right decisions. (FG2)
Debating the value of EHRs for research and planning
Most participants said they were happy for large datasets
to be shared with researchers and policy-makers if this
would lead to better understanding of causes of disease,
the development of more effective treatments, and better
resource allocation, particularly if this could be of direct
benefit to themselves or to future generations. In gen-
eral, participants said they wanted to be informed if de-
tails from their own medical records were shared for
purposes beyond their clinical care. Many wanted to
know how and why their information might be shared, and
who would benefit from this, especially in relation to infor-
mation being used for research and planning purposes.
[If they] explain to me that the database is not only
for medical purposes but would also get us access to
more medical [services] in terms of the way the
commissioning is taking place, then yes, you are
making a good case to get me on the database,
but if you are saying that, oh, I should just provide
my [information] what’s this all this research going
on for? (FG13)
Although focus group participants debated the value
of anonymisation, there was little consensus on what
would qualify as identifying information, or how
anonymisation could be achieved effectively. Many
wondered whether the information from health re-
cords would be reliable and accurate enough to be
used for other purposes such as research and plan-
ning – ‘rubbish in, rubbish out’ was one phrase used
to convey concern for data quality. However, people
living with sickle cell disorders discussed how EHRs
would allow the collection of population-level data on
conditions where patient populations are smaller or
more difficult to locate, which they thought was not
done adequately at the time, leading to decision-
making bias and inequalities.
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If they want to know how many sickle cell patients is
out there, they don’t know it right now, but if they had
that database they’ll be able to go there and get more
information. (FG13)
Ownership and accountability
Although participants highly valued the role of the
English healthcare system in terms of care provision,
many were sceptical when discussing their views on the
ability of the NHS to safeguard medical information and
manage large technological projects.
I just have very little faith in the way that the NHS
handles databases. I don’t think it’s got a very good
record. […] I know how bad some of the IT systems
have been. I’ve had to work with them myself, and we
just hope the National Health Service will get this one
right. They’ve got a few wrong in the past […] (FG3)
A previous project introducing integrated electronic
systems in the NHS (National Programme for IT) had
received negative publicity in the years before the focus
groups took place and was eventually scaled down to a
much narrower scope than initially envisaged. Many par-
ticipants raised this in their comments, along with other
media reports discussing data breaches in the NHS and
other government bodies.
– Always thought that [the NHS] would mess it up.
– I’ve heard a bit about it, that they done it, but they
paid lots of money.
– Yeah but then what they do is that they leave it on a
train, don’t they usually. (FG11)
Some said that they could not fully trust the NHS,
which they characterised as ‘big and bureaucratic’: the
size and bureaucracy being something they linked with
lack of ability to protect sensitive personal and health in-
formation. This was particularly the case when they had
worked in the NHS themselves.
– […] there’s less attention to detail, people are careless,
they’re poorly trained and nobody wants to be
accountable. […]
– And the other thing about the NHS, because I also
worked in the NHS as a temporary administrator,
people are incredibly badly paid and demotivated.
– That’s what I was going to say, temping, they get lots
of temps. (FG9)
Others, however, thought that when information is held
by government-controlled bodies, such as the NHS, ac-
countability would be easier to achieve. This discussion
led on to many participants expressing concern about the
increasing privatisation of the NHS and the impact this
would have on information sharing with private compan-
ies, where, they said, it would be more difficult to hold
people accountable for security breaches.
But what I’m also trying to communicate is even
though your information are [sic] within the
government system, you can have an employee who
might be paid by [the] private sector. (FG13)
For many participants commercial exploitation of
health information was seen as a detrimental outcome of
sharing information with private organisations. Pharma-
ceutical companies, for example, were not viewed as
equal partners in the healthcare system. Although partic-
ipants commented on their importance for advances in
medication and treatment, they also feared that medical
information would increasingly be used for purposes
that would provide most profit, as opposed to improving
the wellbeing of the whole population.
Transparency is what we all want to talk about. We’re
not terribly worried about [the development of EHRs],
but don’t use it for profit, just use it for research and
so our carers and our family can deal with [health]
matters. (FG3)
In weighing up benefits and risks from increased infor-
mation sharing, some of the discussions concluded that
there would only be a small probability that privacy risks
would be realised, and that risks would generally carry
significant consequences for specific individuals rather
than the majority of the patient population. As long as
risks are ‘controlled’, some conceded, overall benefits
would outweigh any security concerns. However, many
participants seemed to remain undecided in their views
or said that framing the relationship between benefits
and risks in terms of balance might miss dimensions of
the problem they would be concerned about, such as as-
pects of the context that would influence where the bal-
ance lies under different circumstances. Many expressed
the need to find out more details about how EHRs might
look like in practice and how data would be used for dif-
ferent purposes (e.g., administrative, clinical, research,
policy) before being able to decide how their preferences
may vary.
Discussion
Among the survey respondents 79 % reported that they
would worry about the security of their record if this
were part of a national EHR system, with 71 % indicating
that in their opinion the NHS was unable at the time of
the survey to make EHRs secure as part of a cradle-to-
grave system, used simultaneously for purposes of
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health provision, research and policy. Almost half of
the respondents (47 %) felt that EHRs would be less
secure than the way their records were kept when the
survey was conducted. Of those who reported being
worried about the security of their record, many stated
they would nevertheless be in favour of the develop-
ment of national EHRs (55 %), while only 12 % would
not support national EHRs. The rest of participants re-
ported being undecided (33 %) which could be due to lack
of awareness on the topic or difficulty contextualising the
question in their own specific circumstances.
Survey findings were explored in more detailed focus
groups discussions in which participants weighed up the
potential advantages and disadvantages of implementing
EHRs and negotiated their concerns around: unauthor-
ised access, commercial exploitation, lack of accountabil-
ity, data inaccuracies, prejudice and inequalities in
health provision. Focus groups debated the role of differ-
ent health professionals in the information ecology and
considered how appropriate information sharing might
be organised, highlighting the importance of providing
different access levels to different professional groups
and informing patients about how their information is
used. Participants also expressed doubts about whether
absolute security and privacy can be fully guaranteed
within the health service and many took the view that
overall benefits would outweigh security concerns for
the majority of the population.
Previously published studies describe levels of patient
and public concern similar to those identified in this
paper. For instance, in 2007 a large Canadian survey
showed that almost two thirds of respondents reported
being worried about the privacy of their medical infor-
mation [38]. Follow-up research in 2012 found little
change in safety and security perceptions of the Canad-
ian public [39]. In the US, a nationally representative
study with 3959 participants showed that two-thirds of
adults would be concerned about the security of medical
information transferred between healthcare professionals
electronically or by fax [34]. Although concerns about
personal privacy and loss of control have also been
expressed in a number of previous UK studies, these
primarily focused on the use of medical records for
healthcare provision or for research rather than
encompassing multiple purposes including healthcare
planning [14, 20].
This study extends previous research by providing a
measure of the balance between support for the develop-
ment of national EHRs and views about EHR security.
The results suggest that more than half of those who re-
ported being worried about the security of their record
in a national EHR system and the ability of the NHS to
safeguard integrated EHRs would nevertheless support
their development. In the Canadian study mentioned above,
respondents also thought that avenues for meaningful use
of health technologies should still be explored despite priv-
acy concerns [38]. A US study looking at participation in
biobank research highlighted significant privacy concerns
which did not correlate with resistance to participation in
biomedical studies [40]. Privacy concerns were also
expressed in an Irish mixed-methods study of public atti-
tudes towards using health information from GP records
for research, yet 89.5 % of respondents suggested that they
would still agree to their GP sharing details with re-
searchers [41]. The latter study reflects how patient trust in
specific health professionals (e.g., general practitioners)
might contribute to willingness to share information for
purposes beyond clinical care.
Our survey results emphasise the importance of recog-
nising differences between socio-demographic groups in
the UK to better understand and respond to patient
views and expectations. In this study people who self-
identified as belonging to an ethnic group other than
White British were more likely to suggest that EHRs
would offer better security than existing record keeping
systems. An equally large-scale study on the use of per-
sonal, identifiable information by the National Cancer
Registry for public health research and surveillance,
showed that people from non-white British ethnic
groups were more concerned about privacy breaches
than White British participants [17]. These findings de-
serve further exploration to understand differences in
patient views and preferences in more detail and adapt
policies accordingly.
Opinion differences identified in this study between
those with lower education levels who were more likely
to have confidence in the ability of the NHS to guaran-
tee EHR security than those with degrees diverge from
the Canadian 2007 study, where those with higher edu-
cational attainment had fewer concerns about privacy
and the protection of personal information [38]. We hy-
pothesise that the idiosyncrasies of the Canadian and
British regulatory environments might explain this dis-
tinction, together with the differing history of reported
data breaches and penalties imposed in the two coun-
tries, although further work is needed to understand dif-
ferences between countries and what implications this
might have in practice.
In our study, 35–64 year olds were more likely to re-
port being worried about the security of their record in
an EHR system and less confident in the ability of the
NHS to safeguard EHRs at the time, compared with 25–
34 year olds. Similar differences were noted in a US na-
tionwide survey conducted in 2011, where people under
40 were less sceptical about potential privacy implica-
tions of EHRs [42]. Differences in confidence levels may
be explained by a number of factors such as different
levels of concern about disclosure of health information
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to employers, or existence of a longer medical history
with potentially more conditions that people might not
want to share, particularly in the absence of any mean-
ingful penalties for security breaches.
Situated privacy preferences and conditional sharing
As reflected in our focus group discussions, privacy is
rarely static and one-dimensional, but takes a number of
contextual, situated and relative meanings [43–46]. Pa-
tient willingness to share health information depends on
a number of different parameters, including the extent
to which patients trust those who receive their informa-
tion and the perceived sensitivity of the information be-
ing shared [47]. Previous research also suggests that
people would be more cautious about sharing identifi-
able personal information with other groups beyond
clinical staff [22]. Other studies similarly find that some
patients would refrain from sharing certain types of in-
formation for care improvement or public health pur-
poses [18]. When thinking about disclosing information
in medical settings, individuals seem to perform risk-
benefit calculations [14], in what has been termed ‘priv-
acy calculus’ in studies outside the healthcare arena,
whereby individuals weigh personal gain against poten-
tial harm from information disclosure [48–50]. Since
support for integrated EHRs and wider health informa-
tion sharing is not unconditional, anonymity and con-
sent remain important mechanisms in sustaining public
trust, along with stronger controls and effective commu-
nication mechanisms [20, 23, 41, 47]. Persisting concerns
dependent on changes to the context, personal circum-
stances and preferences, indicate that ‘granular’ privacy
control over which health information should be shared
with whom remains an important issue that deserves
further research and development in practice, as has
been discussed in previous work [51].
Policy and practice implications
Integrated EHRs containing longitudinal information
shared for a number of different purposes, including
health provision, research and planning, are viewed by
governments, policy-makers and health authorities as an
important tool for improving health services, patient
safety and other clinical outcomes, as well as for re-
search [52]. Recent policy initiatives in the UK propose
wider sharing of health information within the health-
care system and external entities such as pharmaceutical
companies and increased use of the NHS number as a
unique patient identifier for all medical encounters [52,
53]. These plans have already raised concerns among pa-
tient communities, health professionals and advocacy
groups about their implications for information privacy
and medical confidentiality, with the most recent con-
troversy concerning the ‘care.data’ GP data extraction
initiative which aims to draw on data collected in pri-
mary care for research and health planning [54–56].
Our survey and focus group findings show that pa-
tients and the public would worry about the security of
EHRs and had similar concerns regarding the ability of
the health service to safeguard information. Their views
were often accompanied by uncertainty around what
EHRs might look like and what wider information shar-
ing with researchers and policy-makers might mean in
practice. In light of recent work suggesting that people
prefer to withhold information from medical profes-
sionals in the presence of security concerns [34], it is
essential to identify ways to ensure both meaningful use
of health information and trustworthy sharing practices
that safeguard patient privacy. Priorities for further
exploration and practical application might include:
privacy by design principles that incorporate privacy
protection in the design stage, rather than viewing it as
an add-on requirement [57], privacy enhancing tech-
niques [58], differential mechanisms that enhance de-
identification in database searches [59, 60], dynamic
context-aware policies [61], purpose-based policies [62]
and notification of privacy breaches to data subjects
[63]. Patient control and choice could also be increased
through the use of dynamic informed consent and revo-
cation options, formally allowing nuanced preference
management as part of EHR systems [64]. This would
support patients in contextually negotiating the advan-
tages and disadvantages of sharing information in differ-
ent circumstances.
Public education about EHRs and meaningful engage-
ment with record keeping could enhance patient input
and address concerns by establishing systems that re-
spond to people’s expectations. Age, ethnicity and edu-
cation differences in security perceptions should be
taken in account to provide clear messaging and to ef-
fectively explain how any security measures would pre-
vent large-scale attacks, how access to records would be
monitored, but also what privacy risks cannot be ad-
equately addressed, such as the potential for patient re-
identification. Improved understanding of the reasons why
people might feel undecided in relation to electronic re-
cords (e.g., because of security concerns or lack of clarity
around what EHRs mean or the extent to which private
organisations have access) would allow a more targeted
approach to address sources of uncertainty.
Limitations and future research
As part of a mixed methods design, this paper presents
one of the few large-scale surveys exploring patient and
public perceptions about EHR security, drawing on a
comprehensive view of EHRs used for multiple purposes
to examine these concerns in the UK. While recruitment
for the survey was primarily carried out in West London
Papoutsi et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making  (2015) 15:86 Page 12 of 15
which might have affected the responses received, we
took several steps to minimise selection bias, including
using a number of different recruitment points (16 in
total), and approaching people at different dates and
times of the day. The analysis adjusted for confounding
factors, although there might be variables that we have
been unable to account for. Qualitative discussions also
included different socio-demographic groups to ensure
we captured a wide range of perspectives.
Inviting responses on privacy preferences without rais-
ing privacy awareness can be challenging, as has been
well documented in the literature on participant priming
[65, 66]. People who agreed to participate in this re-
search might not be as privacy sensitive as individuals
who refrained from taking part, which may have affected
the representativeness of responses. The survey referred
to general perceptions about EHR security rather than
examining specific concerns, which were then explored
in more depth as part of the focus groups. In addition,
survey participants might have interpreted the question-
naire differently, especially with regard to items about
security or privacy which might take multiple contextual
meanings. As the survey asked whether participants
thought ‘the NHS is presently able to make electronic
health records secure’, views may have changed since the
survey was conducted, although findings from focus
groups discussions indicate persisting security worries
based around personal experiences with information
technologies in the health service.
The definition of EHRs provided to survey participants
conveyed UK policy initiatives that were in place when
the survey was designed, but have since been reviewed
to include less ambitious, smaller-scale technological so-
lutions. The notion of national EHRs used for multiple
purposes might have affected participant responses in a
way that requires survey findings to be interpreted for
the current policy environment. This has been addressed
in the group discussions presented here where the focus
shifted from national EHRs to a consideration of smaller
integrated solutions bringing together different parts of
the health service. Future research could focus on the
views and perceptions of privacy sensitive groups (for
one example see [16]), also expanding on the nuanced
nature of privacy needs by considering specific examples
of EHR implementation and targeted areas of concern to
address this multi-dimensional and complex area of
study.
Conclusions
This work suggests that patients and members of the
public remain worried about certain aspects of EHR
security, such as the extent of information sharing, gov-
ernance and accountability risks, the potential for un-
authorised access and prejudice, errors and inaccuracies,
as well as use of health data for profit and exploitation.
Our findings have significant implications for informa-
tion sharing practices, particularly in the context of the
roll out of the primary care data extraction service in
the UK, and other similar initiatives worldwide. Mean-
ingful public engagement and transparency are necessary
to communicate clearly about the aims of integrated
EHRs and to negotiate the boundaries between what pa-
tients and the public deem acceptable to share, and how
health providers or researchers feel health information
should be made accessible. This includes recognition of
age, ethnicity and education differences in patient and
public views about EHR security as identified in this
study. Strengthening information-sharing protocols and
protection mechanisms to account for the contextual
and situated character of privacy preferences and risk-
benefit calculations, while allowing for informed patient
participation and choice, may help increase confidence
in the ability of the health service to manage and share
patient information safely.
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